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Abstract 
We study the relation between bank regulation stringency and announcement effects of 
seasoned equity offerings across 21 countries. Under a low to moderate bank regulation 
environment, the market reacts more positively to the bank SEO announcements for an increase 
in the level of bank regulation. However, the bank SEO announcement effects become more 
negative if the bank regulation becomes too stringent. This inverted U-shaped relation is robust 
after we use the exogenous cross-country and cross-year variation in the timing of the Basel II 
adoption as an instrument to assess the causal impact of bank regulation on SEO announcement 
effects. Bank regulation has no significant impact of SEO announcement effects if the equity 
offering is involuntary.  
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1 Introduction 
The issue of bank capital and its regulation has received renewed attention in the 
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).
 2
 This event led to calls for an increase in bank 
regulation across the world. However, studies have highlighted that stringent bank regulation can 
have ambiguous effects on bank performance and risk-takings (Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 
2000). In this paper, we provide new evidence of the impact of bank regulation on banks by 
examining the stringency of cross-country bank regulation on bank Seasoned Equity Offerings 
(SEOs) announcement effects. This issue is important because SEO announcement effects are a 
substantial portion of SEO flotation costs (Eckbo, Masulis and Norli, 2007). 
Markets in general respond negatively to firm seasoned equity offering (SEO) 
announcements because the issuance is interpreted as an overvaluation signal by the market 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). Commercial bank SEO announcements may also convey such an 
overvaluation signal. However, such an announcement can also mean that banks issue equity to 
maintain capital standards. In this case, the issuance should not contain any information about 
the prospects for the bank. Hence, markets may respond to the bank SEO announcements less 
sensitively, because their issuances contain information that can be interpreted in different ways. 
This argument is supported by empirical evidence (Poloncheck, Slovin, and Shuska, 1989; 
Wansley and Dhillon, 1989; Li, Liu, Siganos, and Zhou, 2016) that announcement effects of 
SEOs by commercial banks or bank holding companies are less negative than those found for 
industrial firms. However, there is potentially conflicting views on the impact of bank regulation 
environment on the extent of such overvaluation signal.  
 Prudential capital regulation forces banks to hold more capital at risk and hence reduces 
the moral hazard of excessive risk taking by internalizing the inefficiency of gambling (Gorton 
and Huang, 2004 and Dam and Koetter, 2012) (capital at risk effect). The reduced moral hazard 
may lead to lower information asymmetry between bank and investors. Other types of regulation 
that directly monitor bank behavior, such as activity restrictions, entry barriers, and deposit 
                                                             
2 We use the terms bank, commercial bank, and bank holding companies interchangeably throughout the paper. 
Investment banks are not considered in this study.  
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insurer power, may also induce truthful revelation by banks (Baron and Besanko, 1984). This 
revelation of private information by banks may help investors to better understand the banks and 
reduce the information asymmetry between issuers and outside investors. Based on the news of 
equity offerings, investors are likely to less heavily discount their valuation of a bank operating 
in more regulated banking markets to consider the smaller agency problems and adverse 
selection risk that investing in such a bank entails. Hence, we should observe a positive relation 
between bank regulation and bank SEO announcements.  
However, Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) provide a competing view that 
excessive bank regulation increases the moral hazard problem (franchise value effect). They 
reason that bank profits are reduced under capital regulation.
3
 These reduced profits imply lower 
franchise values, and hence lower incentives for banks to make good quality loans. Thus, if 
investors find that the existing regulation induces a net moral hazard problem, the market 
reaction to the SEO announcements would be more adverse for banks operating in more 
regulated environments compared to those in less regulated environments. 
In view of the conflicting perspectives noted above, this paper provides direct evidence of 
the impact of bank regulation on bank SEO announcement effects using global data on bank 
SEOs announcements from 1982 to 2012. Following Laeven and Levine (2009) we consider five 
aspects of bank regulation adopted from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004). The first four aspects 
are activity restriction, initial capital stringency, deposit insurer power, and prompt corrective 
action. We use factor analysis to collapse these four regulation measures into a single regulation 
measure – total regulation. The bank SEO announcement effect is measured by the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) over the three-day event window around the announcement date.  
Our results show that when the stringency of bank regulation is below a certain threshold, 
a result like the capital at risk effect holds: the bank SEO announcement effects are more 
positive in a more regulated banking market because of reduced information asymmetry between 
banks and investors. As the stringency of bank regulation crosses certain thresholds, a result like 
the franchise value effect holds: the bank SEO announcement effects are more negative in a more 
regulated banking market because reduced bank franchise value leads to higher moral hazard and 
                                                             
3 The reduction in profits is partly caused by increased competition, as argued by Hellman et al. (2000). It may also 
be caused by the “underinvesting” of banks in loans with positive net present values (Stanton, 1998). 
  
4 
 
information asymmetry.
4
 We thus find an inverted U-shaped relation between the stringency of 
bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effects. This finding is consistent with the model 
of Calem and Rob (1999) that suggests a U-shaped relation between bank capital and risk taking. 
In this relation, undercapitalized banks first take less risk when the bank capital increases and 
then take more risk when the bank capital continues to increase beyond a certain threshold. Their 
findings reconcile the two opposite strands of the literature that find that on one hand bank risk-
taking declines with an increase in capital and, on the other hand, bank risk-taking rises with an 
increase in capital.
5
  
We identify the causal impact of bank regulation on SEO announcement effects. Bank 
regulation tends to be strengthened from various aspects after the adoption of Basel II, which 
varies across country and time. Hence, our identification strategy uses the exogenous country-
time variation in the dynamic process of the Basel II adoption as the instrument for bank 
regulation stringency.  
We also consider the impact of involuntary equity issuance on the relation between bank 
regulation stringency and SEO announcement effects. Previous research suggests that moral 
hazard exists mainly in under-capitalized banks that take excessive risks to exploit the risk-
shifting benefits of deposit insurance. Well-capitalized banks take more risks because they are 
remote from insolvency (Calem and Rob, 1999) or because of factors exogenous to the portfolio 
decisions, such as managerial incompetence or a lack of lending opportunities (Gorton and 
Rosen, 1996). Hence, the relation between bank capital regulation and bank SEO announcement 
effects may be different between under-capitalized (involuntary) and well-capitalized (voluntary) 
bank issuance (Gorton and Rosen, 1996). We include an indicator for involuntary issues as well 
as the interaction of this indicator with both the linear and the quadratic terms of initial capital 
stringency. We find that the stringency of the regulation on the source of funds that can be 
counted as regulatory capital does not have any impact on the announcement effects of 
involuntary issuances. These results are consistent with the finding of Cornett and Tehranian 
                                                             
4 We do not argue that there is an optimal level of regulation determined by the threshold where the impact of bank 
regulation on bank SEO announcement effects switches. The optimal level of bank regulation is determined by 
factors that are beyond the scope of this study.  
5 See, for example, Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley (1990) for arguments in favour of a decline in bank risk-
taking with a capital increase; Koehn and Santomero (1980) for arguments that bank risk-taking rises with an 
increase in capital. Williams (2014) finds a U-shaped relation between bank risk and bank capital. 
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(1994) that the issuance of equity required maintaining capital standards (involuntary issuance) 
does not convey any signal of the prospects of the firm.  
Our results are consistent with the previous literature in that stringent bank regulation 
may have ambiguous effects on bank performance and risk taking. Blum (1999) suggests that 
over-regulation has two effects on banks. First, it lowers bank profits, and the banks have less to 
lose in the event of a bankruptcy. Therefore, banks are likely to increase risks. Second, under a 
binding regulation environment, equity is more valuable to the bank. However, because equity 
issuance is expensive or even impossible for some banks, the only way for a bank to increase 
equity is to increase risk. Using a comprehensive database on bank regulation and supervision 
across 107 countries, Barth et al. (2004) find a negative relation between various regulation and 
supervision measures, bank development, performance, and stability. Their findings raise a red 
flag regarding extensive bank regulation and supervisory practices that involve direct 
government oversight of and restrictions on banks.  
Our findings are also consistent with the “tollbooth hypothesis” of Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), which states that regulation is pursued for the benefit of 
politicians and bureaucrats. In addition, the cross-country differences in banking regulations 
encourage the flow of bank capital from highly regulated banking markets to those less regulated, 
a phenomenon also referred to as the “race to the bottom” (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2006; 
Houston, Lin, and Ma, 2012). Hence, the existence of regulation differences across countries 
may limit the banks in more regulated banking markets to explore their economic opportunities. 
This evidence is consistent with the notion that a stringent regulation only positively impacts 
bank performance if the benefits of higher standards exceed the costs, including both the direct 
compliance costs and the indirect negative costs due to increased risk taking or regulation 
arbitrage.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and 
methodology. Section 3 presents our empirical results of the inverted U-shaped relation between 
bank regulation and SEO announcement effects. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2 Data and variables 
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2.1 Data sources and sample selection 
We select data from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS) (2001, 2003, 2007, 
2011) database of the World Bank. These four world-wide surveys on bank regulation are 
conducted by Barth et al. (2004, 2006, 2008, 2012).
6
 This comprehensive survey-database is 
compiled from answers provided by official regulatory and supervisory authorities and includes 
various measures on bank regulation.   
We collect global SEOs made by commercial banks (SIC codes 6000 to 6199) from 
Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Platinum’s Global New Issues database. We collect the full 
sample of global common stock offerings during the sample period from January 1, 1982, to 
December 31, 2012, excluding initial public offerings, units, rights, and mutual conversions.
7
 We 
match the bank-level information with the bank regulation measures to explore the link between 
bank regulation and the wealth effects associated with the announcements of bank-issued SEOs. 
Following Barth, Lin, Ma, Seade, and Song (2013), the values of the regulatory variables for the 
year 2001 are taken from the first survey for 2001; the values of the regulatory variables for the 
2002-2004 period are taken from the second survey for 2003; the values of regulatory variables 
for the 2005-2008 period are taken from the survey for 2007; and the regulatory measures for the 
2008-2012 period are taken from the fourth survey for 2011.
8
 We then merge the bank regulation 
data with the stock price and accounting data from Datastream. 
The banks included in our sample are chosen based on data availability: 1) we only 
include the countries with index price data in Datastream; 2) we exclude New Zealand because 
all its major banks are subsidiaries of Australian banks and these are already included in the 
sample; 3) we exclude those countries with less than 10 SEOs during the entire sample period to 
allow for a meaningful sample of banks to represent each country. Our sample finally consists of 
1,307 SEOs from 21 countries over the sample period of 2001-2012. 
2.2 Bank regulation variables 
                                                             
6 The first three surveys capture information as of 1999, 2001, and 2005, respectively. The 2012 survey covers the 
period from 2008 to 2010. 
7 We do not consider the issuance of Contingent Convertible bonds (CoCos) in our analysis because these hybrid 
capital securities are different from equity in nature, although they may be treated as tier 2 bank capital.  
8 We also attempt alternative methods for assigning values, such as moving all the thresholds one year before or one 
year after, and find that the results are robust. These results are available upon request from the authors.  
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We consider four aspects or measures of bank regulation adopted by the BRSS. First, 
Activity Restriction is an indicator of the degree to which national regulatory authorities allow 
banks to engage in three fee-based activities, i.e., securities market activities (e.g., underwriting, 
brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry), insurance (e.g., insurance 
underwriting and selling), and real estate businesses (e.g., real estate investment, development, 
and management). Second, Initial Capital Stringency measures whether the source of funds that 
count as regulatory capital may include assets other than cash or government securities or 
borrowed funds and whether the regulatory/supervisory authorities verify the sources of capital. 
Third, Deposit Insurer Power is an index of deposit insurer power to measure each country’s 
deposit insurance regime and to trace its evolution from 1999 to 2011. It measures the extent to 
which the regulator has the authority to make the decision to intervene in a bank and take legal 
action against bank directors or officials and whether it has ever taken any legal action against 
bank directors or officers. Fourth, Prompt Corrective Action measures the extent to which the 
law establishes pre-determined levels of bank solvency deterioration that force automatic 
enforcement actions, such as intervention, and the extent to which supervisors have the requisite, 
suitable powers to do so.  
Finally, we collapse these four regulation measures into a single measure of bank 
regulation – Total Regulation – by using factor analysis. Higher values of all the five regulation 
measures indicate more stringency. We estimate the following equation: 
                                         (1) 
where the subscripts i, s, and t correspond to respectively the country, the four regulation 
measures (Activity Restriction, Initial Capital Stringency, Deposit Insurer Power, and Prompt 
Corrective Action), and years, respectively. The left-hand-side variables (Yi,s,t) are the four 
regulation measures, all of which are stacked into a single factor, whereas Regulation is not 
observed and is estimated along with the factor loadings  . We follow the standard practice of 
normalizing proxy measures included on the left-hand side to have a mean of zero and a variance 
of one before we conduct the factor analysis. The estimation of Equation (1) generates predicted 
values for both a set of factors (             ) and a set of factor loadings,   . We focus on the 
single factor that has the greatest explanatory power. It turns out that our data are well described 
by a one-factor model that captures approximately 55% of the variation in the four regulation 
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measures. We take this factor with the greatest explanatory power as our measure of total 
regulation.
9,10
  
2.3 CAR and control variables 
We use the 3-day event window (day -1 to day +1) to measure the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) associated with the SEO announcements using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
market model regression (Brown and Warner, 1985) with an estimation window of (day -250 to 
day -10). We estimate CARs using national stock market indexes. The announcement day 
reported by SDC is denoted as day 0, one day before this date is denoted as day -1, and the day 
after is day +1.
11
 A 240-day (day -250 to day -10) period for each observation is used for the 
estimation of the abnormal returns.   
We include bank-specific, market-specific, and country-specific variables in our analysis of 
SEO announcement stock returns. Ln(TA) is the natural logarithm of total assets, which measures 
the size of the bank. Previous studies (for example, Kang and Stulz, 1996) suggest that larger 
firms are likely to have a lower level of information asymmetry and may be associated with less 
negative announcement effects. The capital level of the bank is measured as the ratio of 
Equity/Total Assets. Firms with a lower capital level are considered riskier, facing higher 
expected costs of financial distress, and hence more negative announcement effects. 
Diversification is a control variable for the level of bank diversification and is measured as non-
interest income divided by total operating income. In previous studies, bank diversification is 
assumed to have a conflicting impact on bank risk-taking (Stiroh, 2004, and Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Levine, 2006), which may have implications for the bank’s moral hazard and the SEO 
announcement effects.  
Market run-up is the cumulative stock return over the window (-60,-2) relative to the 
announcement date. It measures the overall market and economic conditions, as well as the 
                                                             
9 The detailed definitions and the calculation of the regulation variables are described in Appendix 1. 
10 Barth et al. (2004) also consider a capital stringency index that measures the extent of regulatory requirements 
about the amount of capital that banks must hold. However, most of our sample countries have adopted the Basel 
II/III regulation, and the capital requirements do not vary significantly between countries. In addition, banks 
generally hold more capital voluntarily than the required level, and the changes in capital regulation do not affect the 
capital structures of banks (Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 2011). For that reason, we do not consider the capital 
stringency index in our empirical analysis. 
11 We use the filing date reported by the SDC as the announcement date. If the filing date is not available, then we 
use the issue date instead.  
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growth expectations, during the period leading up to the security offer (see, for example, 
Korajczyk and Levy, 2003, and Lowry, 2003). Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) argue that 
investor reactions are typically less negative following the increases in stock market prices due to 
the lower costs of external equity financing during market expansions. Therefore, investors react 
less negatively in good economic conditions. Stock Run-up is the cumulative stock return over 
the window (-60,-2) relative to the announcement date. Lucas and McDonald (1990) argue that 
after a period of positive abnormal returns, overvalued firms have incentives to issue equity 
directly, which may be associated with a more negative announcement effect. Stock Volatility is 
the annualized stock return volatility that measures the firm’s riskiness calculated from daily 
returns over the day interval from day -250 to day -10 relative to the equity announcement date. 
Several previous studies assume that firms with a higher stock volatility face higher costs of 
attracting new debt financing (see, for example, Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward, 1999, 2003), and 
hence more negative announcement effects.  
Finally, we control for a group of country-specific variables: inflation, the KKZ-index (an 
index of institutional development), Economic Freedom, and GDP Growth. The KKZ-index is 
from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008). A higher value of the KKZ-index indicates a more 
advanced level of institutional development. Economic Freedom is derived from the Heritage 
Foundation and is the average value of an index of economic freedom (freedom from 
government interference afforded to businesses and individuals) for the 2001-2012 period. It 
measures the extent of how much freedom individuals and firms can obtain from their 
governments to conduct their business. GDP Growth is the annual growth rate of the country’s 
GDP. A nation with higher GDP Growth is more likely to have efficient domestic financial 
systems (Sturm and Williams, 2008). We expect that the bank SEO announcement effect is 
associated with lower inflation, higher GDP growth, better institutional development, and more 
economic freedom. We scale all the regulation measures so that they are bounded between 0 and 
1. 
2.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the regulatory restrictions across countries.  
[Please Insert Table 1 here] 
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We observe a wide variation in all aspects of our regulation measures of Activity Restriction, 
Initial Capital Stringency, Deposit Insurer Power, Prompt Corrective Action, and Total 
Regulation. Each number of these indices measure the extent to which banks are regulated, with 
1 being extremely stringent and 0 being no restrictions. These numbers are on an ordinal scale, 
so they do not have economic meanings by themselves. In order to interpret the numbers, it is 
necessary to compare numbers between countries with different values.  For example, Activity 
Restriction varies from a low of 0.13 in Germany and 0.14 in Thailand to a high of 0.75 in China. 
These results indicate that China forbids banks from engaging in most non-banking activities, 
such as securities, insurance, and real estate activities. Germany and Thailand, on the other hand, 
have relatively low restrictions for banks that want to participate in these markets. The UK has 
the highest value of Initial Capital Stringency (1.00). We find that on average, developing 
countries have lower Deposit Insurer Power. The average value for Deposit Insurer Power in 
Brazil, China, and India are all zero, which indicates that in these countries, the regulators do not 
have much authority to make the decision to intervene in a bank and take legal action against 
bank directors or officials.
12
 Indonesia has the greatest supervisory power with the highest 
Prompt Corrective Action level (1.00), indicating the greatest power to force automatic 
enforcement actions when the level of bank solvency deterioration is reached.  
Table 2 provides the summary statistics for the key variables for the sample.  
[Please Insert Table 2 here] 
We observe a wide variation of the characteristics of the regulatory restrictions across 
countries in all aspects of our regulation measures of Activity Restriction, Initial Capital 
Stringency, Deposit Insurer Power, Prompt Corrective Action, and Total Regulation. We find 
that on average Activity Restriction is 0.45, which indicates that most of the banks have limited 
ability to engage in the businesses of securities underwriting, insurance, and real estate and of the 
regulatory restrictiveness of banks to own shares in non-financial firms. Banks on average have 
an Initial Capital Stringency measure of 0.72, indicating that most banks can include funds other 
than cash, government securities, and borrowed funds as regulatory capital. We find that on 
average Deposit Insurer Power is 0.41, which indicates that most countries have limited power 
                                                             
12 Low deposit insurer power is not only limited to developing countries: Greece and Austria also score low on 
deposit insurer power (all have scores of 0.01 or 0). 
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to intervene in banks during the sample period. On average the supervisory power is high since 
the Prompt Corrective Action level is at 0.83. This result indicates that most countries have the 
power to force automatic enforcement actions when the level of bank solvency deterioration is 
reached.  
The Total Assets of the banks in our sample range from $0.04 billion to $3.06 trillion, 
with the average total assets being $197 billion. The capital level is measured as Equity/Total 
Assets. The results for this variable show that, on average, banks hold a ratio of 7.27% equity to 
their total assets. The Diversification variable shows that, on average, 32.16% of the total 
operating income of the banks in our sample is from non-interest income, with the minimum and 
maximum being 6.93% and 71.85%, respectively. Bank SEOs announcements are, on average, 
preceded by a Market Run-up (4.00%) and individual Stock Run-ups (4.32%), indicating that 
banks tend to announce SEOs after a period of stock price appreciations. The KKZ-index ranges 
from -0.93 to 1.69, which indicates wide variations in institutional development across the 
sample countries. The Economic Freedom index also shows significant variations among sample 
countries from 51 to 90, with the mean value being 72.38.  
To capture stock price reactions to bank SEOs announcement, we calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) using different event windows. These results are included in Table 3.  
[Please Insert Table 3 here] 
The result for the event window (-1,+1) shows that banks on average experience a -0.74% 
CAR over the 3-day period surrounding the announcement. The median CAR over the same 
event window is -0.45%. Both the mean and the median are significant at the 1% significance 
level. As a robustness check, we also calculate CARs for different event windows. As seen in 
Table 3, all these CARs have means and medians that are negative and that are significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level.  
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Main regression analysis 
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We estimate five model specifications to assess the impact of bank regulation on bank 
SEO announcement effects. The results are presented in Table 4.  
[Please Insert Table 4 here] 
The dependent variable is the CAR over the 3-day interval between Days -1 and +1 around the 
announcement date. Columns (1) to (5) include our five regulation measures, i.e., Activity 
Restriction, Initial Capital Stringency, Deposit Insurer Power, Prompt Corrective Action, and 
Total Regulation, respectively.  
More specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
                   
                                   (2) 
where         is the CAR of bank b in country c;    is a matrix of bank regulation variables; 
     is a matrix of bank-level control variables, such as bank size, equity to assets ratio, and 
diversification;      is a matrix of issue-specific variables, such as market run-up, stock run-up, 
and stock volatility;    is a matrix of country-level control variables, including inflation, KKZ-
index, Economic freedom, and GDP growth;      is the error term; and  ,  , α, β, and γ are 
vectors of the coefficient estimates.  We include the square terms of the bank regulation variables 
to examine the possible non-linear relation between bank regulation and SEO announcement 
effects. We include year fixed effects in all regressions to control for other plausible time-
invariant characteristics that may affect stock price reactions to the SEO announcements. We 
cannot use bank fixed-effects because there is limited cross sectional variations in the time 
period studied.
13
  
The overall results presented in Table 4 imply a curvilinear, non-monotonic relation 
between these regulation measures and the CARs over the (-1, +1) window associated with bank 
SEO announcements.
14
 The results highlight the importance of the level of bank regulation on 
CARs. We find a positive and significant coefficient for Initial Capital Stringency, Deposit 
Insurer Power, Prompt Corrective Action, and Total Regulation and a negative and significant 
coefficient for their respective quadratic terms. These results suggest that there is an inverted U-
                                                             
13 We also don’t use country fixed effects because they essentially remove country variations. 
14 We also try a specification with only linear terms of bank regulation variables and find no significant results. To 
save space, we do not report these results in the paper but they are available upon request.  
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shaped relation between the stringency of bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effects. 
Under a low to moderate bank regulation environment, the market perceives that more regulation 
facilitates the taking of less risk and the reduction in the moral hazard of banks. Hence, the 
market reacts more positively to the bank SEO announcements compared to a less regulated 
market. However, if bank regulation becomes too stringent and increases beyond a certain level, 
investors are likely to become concerned that the too stringent regulation reduces the franchise 
value of the banks and that this regulation will induce more risk-taking, and hence a net moral 
hazard, by the banks. Thus, the market may react more negatively to the bank SEO 
announcement in more regulated markets. 
We calculate the inflection point of the quadratic function and compare it with the 
distribution of the data. In Column (2), the inflection point is 0.63. The CAR initially increases 
and reaches the maximum value as Initial Capital Stringency reaches 0.63, and then it declines 
as Initial Capital Stringency reaches 1. The inflection points for Deposit Insurer Power, Prompt 
Corrective Action, and Total Regulation are 0.51, 0.44, and 0.60, respectively, which are 51%, 44%
and 60% of the distribution of the measures.  
The only regulation variable for which we do not find significant results is Activity 
Restriction. Barth et al. (2004) suggest that restricting bank activities is associated with an 
increase in the likelihood of suffering a major crisis because broad banking power allows a bank 
to diversify income sources and enhance stability. However, broad financial activities may also 
intensify moral hazard problems and provide more opportunities for banks to increase risk taking 
(Boyd, Chang, and Smith, 1998). Moreover, broad activities may lead to the formation of 
extremely large and complex entities that are extraordinarily difficult to monitor and that are “too 
big to discipline” (Laeven and Levine, 2007). Thus, banks with broader activities are more likely 
to experience a more negative announcement effect upon equity issuance because investors may 
perceive these banks to be too complex and opaque. Therefore, investors may have less 
confidence in equity issuance by these banks. Our finding of insignificant coefficients for 
Activity Restriction may be the result of these two canceling effects of bank diversification on 
bank performance.
15
 
                                                             
15  This result is also consistent with the non-significant results of diversification as a control variable in the 
regression model.  
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To a large extent, the signs and significance levels of the control variables are in line with 
our expectations. For example, bank size, measured as Ln(TA), is a significant determinant of the 
SEO announcement effect, where SEOs by large banks are more likely to be associated with 
higher CARs. This result is consistent with Abhyankar and Dunning (1999), who find that larger 
banks are more efficient and have less information asymmetry problems. We observe that 
Market Run-up tends to be positively associated with the bank SEO announcement effect. This 
finding is consistent with Choe et al. (1993), who find that investor reaction is less negative 
following increases in stock market prices. We also observe that GDP Growth is positively 
associated with the bank SEO announcement effect. This result is expected because, with higher 
GDP growth, banks may have more business opportunities and can sustain positions of abnormal 
profitability (Goddard, Liu, Molyneux, and Wilson, 2011). 
We perform additional tests to verify the robustness of our results and present the results 
in Table 5.  
[Please Insert Table 5 here] 
First, we consider the predominance of the bank SEOs in the U.S. in our sample (49%) 
may bias our results and that the effect of the stock price reactions around bank SEOs is driven 
by the U.S. banks issued SEOs. We hence also use the sample without the U.S. data. Second, we 
consider the heterogeneity of the transparency environment across the sample countries that may 
distort our findings. We present the results of the stock price reactions around bank SEOs 
announcement using only the SEOs issued by banks in the OECD countries.
16
 Finally, we 
examine the stock price reactions around bank SEO announcement using the sample without 
rights offerings and secondary offerings. Both offerings are for existing shareholders only and 
may have a different stock market reaction around the announcement date compared to ordinary 
seasoned equity offerings. We focus on Initial Capital Stringency, Deposit Insurer Power, 
Prompt Corrective Action, which are found significant in the main regression analysis. Overall, 
our main findings continue to hold when using these three robustness checks. We still find that 
there is still an inverted U-shaped relation between the stringency of bank regulation and bank 
SEO announcement effects. 
                                                             
16 There are 13 OECD countries in our sample, i.e. Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, UK, and USA. 
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3.2 Instrumental variable analysis 
 The above-mentioned results demonstrate that bank SEO announcement effects are 
strongly associated with the stringency of bank regulation across countries. While we argue that 
these results are consistent across specifications, endogeneity remains a possibility. The reverse 
causality is probably not a serious concern in our regression analysis because SEO 
announcement effects are not likely to impact on bank regulation. However, simultaneity may 
exist; for example, the observed inverted U-shaped relation between our bank regulation 
measures and the SEO announcement effects may be driven by some unknown factors that have 
an impact on both bank regulation and the bank SEO announcement effects. We exploit the 
variations in the country-specific process of the adoption of the Basel II framework to identify 
exogenous changes in bank regulation. The Basel II accord adopts a “three pillars” concept. The 
first pillar addresses the maintenance of regulatory capital, calculated for three major 
components of risk that a bank faces: credit, operational, and market risk. The second pillar is 
supervisory review, giving regulators more tools to supervise banks from different aspects. The 
third pillar is the development of a set of disclosure requirements that allow the market 
participants to gauge the capital adequacy of a bank. Bank regulation tends to be strengthened 
from different aspects after the adoption of Basel II and varies across countries and over time. 
For example, Austria adopted Basel II in 2005, whereas Malaysia adopted it only in 2010. 
Consequently, we use the exogenous cross-country and cross-year variation in the timing of the 
Basel II adoption as the instrument to measure bank regulation stringency to assess the causal 
impact of bank regulation on SEO announcement effects. We define the Basel II dummy that 
equals 1 for the time after the country adopted Basel II and 0 otherwise. We use a two-stage least 
squares model (2SLS) to conduct the analysis and the results are presented in Table 6.  
 [Please Insert Table 6 here] 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the first stage results of the two-stage least squares 
regressions. We find that the coefficients of Basel II are significantly positive for Activity 
Restriction, Initial Capital Stringency, Prompt Corrective Action, Deposit Insurer Power, and 
Total Regulation. These results indicate that bank regulation became more stringent after the 
adoption of Basel II by the respective countries.  
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Panel B of Table 6 presents the second stage results of the two-stage least squares 
regressions. We find that the coefficients of the linear terms of Initial Capital Stringency, Prompt 
Corrective Action, and Total Regulation are positive and significant. Also, the squared terms of 
these bank regulation measures are significantly negative. These findings confirm our main 
findings that the relation between bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effects is an 
inverted U shaped non-linear relation. 
3.3 Involuntary equity issuance 
In this section, we consider the impact of involuntary equity issuance on the relation 
between the bank SEO announcement effects and the stringency level of bank regulation. Due to 
bank capital regulation, particularly after the implementation of the Basel Accord, banks are 
sometimes forced to involuntarily issue stock to meet government capital requirements. Besanko 
and Kanatas (1996) argue that forcing undercapitalized banks to issue equity to meet government 
requirements reduces the expected surplus available to bank “insider” shareholders, who 
therefore provide less effort to monitor loan repayments. Hence, the reduction in insider effort 
reduces the equity value of the bank. For the 1975-1986 period, Keeley (1989) documents a 
more negative announcement effect for involuntary bank stock issues compared to voluntary 
issues. He proposes three explanations for this finding: the reduction of the value of the deposit 
insurance guarantee, the distortion of the capital structure optimum, and the conveyance of 
unfavorable information about the firm.  
However, Cornett and Tehranian (1994) argue that, for Keeley’s sample, the regulator 
has the discretion to force involuntary bank stock issuance. Therefore, such an issue may convey 
inside information about the issuing bank. Cornett and Tehranian (1994) instead classify equity 
issues by “undercapitalized” banks with total capital ratios below 7% as involuntary issues. They 
find that these voluntary stock issuances have significantly lower negative abnormal stock 
returns than involuntary stock issues. This finding confirms their hypothesis that the issuance of 
equity, required to maintain capital standards, does not convey any signal about the prospects of 
the firm. Cornett, Mehran, and Tehranian (1998) find that banks that voluntarily (but not 
involuntarily) issue common stock experience a significant drop in the matched adjusted 
operating performance in the benchmark firm’s adjusted stock prices following the issue. They 
also find that there is a negative stock market reaction to post-issue quarterly earnings 
  
17 
 
announcements. These results confirm that banks with the discretion to issue equity do so when 
they are overvalued.  
Using an extended data set from 1983 to 2005 that covers more recent bank regulation 
changes, particularly the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 
1991, Krishnan, Ergungor, Lauz, Singh, and Zebedee (2010) find that both undercapitalized and 
well-capitalized banks have significantly negative mean abnormal returns around SEO 
announcements. This result indicates that investors do not perceive these two types of banks to 
be economically different. Therefore, the theories and empirical evidence on the relation between 
involuntary and voluntary bank SEO announcement effects are not conclusive. 
Calem and Rob (1999) suggest that although banks engage in more risk-taking when 
capital levels are very low or very high (hence, a U-shaped relation between bank capital and 
risk-taking), the incentives behind the risk-taking are different. Undercapitalized banks take 
more risks to exploit the risk-shifting benefits of deposit insurance. Hence, they reflect moral 
hazard problems. However, well-capitalized banks take more risks because they are remote from 
insolvency. Gorton and Rosen (1996) also argue that well-capitalized banks take excessive risks 
due to factors exogenous to portfolio decisions, such as managerial incompetence or a lack of 
lending opportunities. Therefore, the relation between bank regulation and the bank SEO 
announcement effects may be different between under-capitalized (involuntary) and well-
capitalized (voluntary) bank issuance.   
We conduct two empirical tests to investigate this relation. First, we classify bank 
voluntary and involuntary SEOs based on the capital requirements of their own countries. We 
define a dummy variable, involuntary, that takes a value of one if the bank SEO is issued when 
either of the following ratios is less than the government requirement: the bank’s equity-to-assets 
ratio, the Tier 1 capital ratio, or the total capital ratio. Otherwise, the value of the dummy 
variable is zero. We include this dummy variable in our main regression to examine whether 
involuntary bank SEOs have higher or lower announcement effects than their voluntary 
counterparts. Second, we include the interaction terms between the Involuntary dummy and both 
the linear and the quadratic terms of the Initial Capital Stringency variable. These are included in 
our main regression to examine whether the previously found inverted U-shaped relation 
between bank capital regulation and bank SEO announcement effects is different between 
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voluntary and involuntary issues. We do not consider the other four regulation measures because 
voluntary/involuntary issuance is mainly related to bank capital regulation. Table 7 presents the 
results. 
 [Please Insert Table 7 here] 
In column (1) we find that involuntary SEOs do not have lower CARs than voluntary 
SEOs. This result is inconsistent with Besanko and Kanatas (1996) and Keely (1989) that 
involuntary SEOs contain negative information about the bank and may decrease the bank’s 
equity value. In Column (2), we find that the coefficients for Initial Capital Stringency and the 
interaction of Involuntary and Initial Capital Stringency are both significant and at a similar level 
in magnitude, but have opposite signs. When we sum the coefficients of Initial Capital 
Stringency and the interaction of Involuntary and Initial Capital Stringency to examine the 
impact of initial capital stringency on involuntary bank SEO announcement effects, the outcome 
is close to zero and is not significantly different from zero.
17
 We also find a similar pattern for 
the coefficients of Initial Capital Stringency Squared and its interaction term with Involuntary. 
When we sum the coefficients of Initial Capital Stringency square and its interaction term with 
Involuntary, the outcome is close to zero and is not significantly different from zero.
18
 These 
results indicate that bank capital regulation has no significant impact on the announcement 
effects of Involuntary bank SEOs.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 The GFC has spurred renewed interest in assessing appropriate regulatory reforms. 
However, how the level of the stringency of bank regulation may impact the announcement 
effect on equity issuance announcements remains a question. Building on a recent world-wide 
survey, we examine the effects on bank regulation and the SEO announcement effects.  
We find that bank regulation has a nonlinear relation with bank-issued SEO 
announcement effects. More specifically, we find an inverted U-shaped relation with the SEO 
announcement effect. This effect increases as the level of bank regulation increases and then 
                                                             
17 The F-test statistics is 0.53, with the p-value being 0.47 
18 The F-test statistics is 0.48, with the p-value being 0.49. 
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decreases as the level of bank regulation continues to increase. Regarding bank regulation, we 
find that higher initial capital stringency, prompt corrective action, deposit insurer power, and 
total regulation particularly exert a positive impact on the SEO announcement effect initially but 
that the impact becomes negative when these regulations rise too high. The results imply that 
bank regulation may play a dual role in affecting the stock price reaction to SEO announcements.  
We use the different timings of the adoption of the Basel II framework by different 
countries as a source of exogenous variation to address the endogeneity concern in our 
regressions. Our main findings hold. We further find that involuntary bank SEOs are associated 
with more negative SEO announcement effects than their voluntary counterparts and that the 
stringency of the regulation on the source of funds that can be counted as regulatory capital do 
not have any further impact on the announcement effects of these involuntary issuances.  
Our paper has timely implications for the current debate over bank regulation after the 
GFC. The GFC has highlighted the importance of adequate bank regulation and supervision. The 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and the Consumer Protection Act in the United 
States in 2010 triggered an extensive debate on the effect of tighter bank regulation. Whereas 
regulators perceive that strengthened bank regulation may promote a more resilient banking 
sector (Furlong and Keeley, 1989; Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tressel, 2008; and Repullo 
and Suarez, 2013), practitioners, and others cast doubt, noting that the cost of financial regulation 
may outweigh the benefits (Furlong and Kwan, 2000). Calem and Rob (1999) find a U-shaped 
relation between capital regulation and risk taking: as a bank’s capital regulation increases, it 
initially takes less risk; but if the capital requirement is too high, then it may induce more risk 
taking by ex-ante well-capitalized banks that comply with the new standard.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the regulation variables of equity issuers 
This table includes the countries that are included in our study. Column N represents the number of SEOs by 
banks from this country in the sample period (January 2001 to December 2012). The remainder of the table 
reports the mean figures (in percentage form) of the regulation variables over the sample period for each 
country. A detailed description of the definitions of the variables is included in Appendix 1. 
Country obs 
Activity 
restriction 
Initial capital 
stringency 
Depositor 
protection 
Prompt 
corrective 
action 
Total 
regulation 
Australia 89 0.44 0.78 0.19 0.88 0.54 
Austria 13 0.51 0.46 0.03 0.78 0.36 
Brazil 11 0.70 0.64 0.00 0.86 0.48 
Canada 19 0.52 0.82 0.79 0.47 0.82 
Chile 11 0.51 0.33 0.61 0.95 0.56 
China 8 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.22 
France 13 0.38 0.67 0.54 0.51 0.63 
Germany 46 0.13 0.57 0.07 0.56 0.32 
Greece 43 0.46 0.88 0.01 0.64 0.52 
Hong Kong 9 0.64 0.56 0.22 0.82 0.52 
India 122 0.45 0.33 0.00 0.76 0.27 
Indonesia 34 0.70 0.33 0.75 1.00 0.68 
Israel 20 0.42 0.73 0.02 0.81 0.44 
Italy 39 0.50 0.75 0.00 0.31 0.47 
Japan 72 0.49 0.64 0.18 0.94 0.50 
Malaysia 16 0.38 0.67 0.52 0.63 0.63 
Portugal 17 0.37 0.69 0.06 0.76 0.43 
Spain 22 0.46 0.45 0.61 0.58 0.59 
Thailand 22 0.14 0.52 0.03 0.73 0.27 
UK 15 0.39 1.00 0.02 0.35 0.55 
USA 666 0.46 0.84 0.64 0.92 0.78 
Mean 
 
0.45 0.72 0.41 0.83 0.62 
Min. 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 
Max. 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Std. dev.   0.16 0.25 0.44 0.21 0.27 
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Table 2 Summary statistics for the regulation, bank-specific and country-specific variables 
This table provides the summary statistics for the control variables of the regulation, bank-specific and country-specific variables 
over the sample period of January 2001 to December 2012. The sample consists of 463 banks in 20 countries for a 4-period 
panel. The variables are defined as outlined in Appendix 1. Total assets are in billion U.S. dollars. N denotes the number of 
observations.  
Variable N Mean Std.dev Median Min. Max. 
Dependent variable 
CAR (-1, 1) 
1307 -0.74 5.31 -0.45 -22.45 17.38 
Regulation variables 
      
Activity Restriction 1307 0.45 0.16 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Initial Capital Stringency 1307 0.72 0.25 0.67 0.00 1.00 
Deposit Insurer Power 1307 0.41 0.44 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Prompt Corrective Action 1307 0.83 0.21 0.83 0.00 1.00 
Total Regulation 1307 1.00 0.44 0.93 0.35 1.61 
Bank-specific variables 
      Total Assets 1307 197 518.00 14.00 0.04 3060.00 
Equity/Total Assets 1307 7.27 3.22 6.88 1.53 16.38 
Diversification 1307 32.16 15.21 30.73 6.93 71.85 
Market Run-up 1307 4.00 8.30 5.44 -21.54 22.21 
Stock Run-up 1307 4.32 14.87 4.56 -33.28 42.81 
Stock Return Volatility 1307 80.50 63.84 47.60 9.79 174.77 
Country-specific variables 
      Inflation 183 2.61 2.66 2.23 -6.01 18.15 
KKZ-index 183 0.96 0.63 1.20 -0.93 1.69 
Economic Freedom 183 72.38 9.87 78.00 51.00 90.00 
GDP Growth 183 2.19 3.34 2.55 -7.10 14.20 
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Table 3 Cumulative abnormal return 
This table provides the mean and median values of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for different event 
windows over the sample period from January 2001 to December 2012. CARs are estimated using the standard 
market model procedure with the time window (day -250, day -10) as the estimation window. Day 0 is the 
announcement date. N represents the number of observations. The t-statistics are used to assess whether the CARs 
are significantly different from zero. *** represents a 1% significance level using a two-tailed test. 
Event window Observations Mean Median 
(-10,10) 1307 -0.79*** -0.68*** 
(-10,1) 1307 -1.22*** -0.84*** 
(-5,5) 1307 -0.71*** -0.60*** 
(-1,1) 1307 -0.74*** -0.45*** 
(-1,0) 1307 -0.67*** -0.32*** 
(-1,2) 1307 -1.02*** -0.71*** 
(-2,1) 1307 -0.96*** -0.52*** 
(0,1) 1307 -0.79*** -0.35*** 
(0,2) 1307 -0.55*** -0.54*** 
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Table 4 Bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effect: OLS approach 
This table presents the results of the regression analyses of stock price reactions around bank SEOs from 21 countries for the period from January 2001 to December 2012. The dependent variable is the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) measured over the window (-1, 1) relative to the announcement date, calculated using standard event study methodology with the estimation period from -250 days to -10 days. The t-statistics 
are computed as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets. Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix 1. N denotes the number of observations. *, 
**, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Activity Restriction Initial Capital Stringency Deposit Insurer Power Prompt Corrective Action Total Regulation 
Bank Regulation 0.711 9.195*** 5.278* 3.376** 8.590** 
 
(1.180) (2.826) (1.707) (2.245) (2.404) 
Bank Regulation Squared 
-0.149 -7.260*** -5.209** -3.847** -7.133** 
 
(-1.000) (-3.130) (-2.230) (-2.273) (-2.459) 
Ln(TA) 0.166** 0.155* 0.121 0.136* 0.144* 
 
(2.068) (1.941) (1.520) (1.699) (1.804) 
Equity/Total Assets 0.042 0.038 0.043 0.041 0.036 
 
(1.135) (1.017) (1.144) (1.135) (0.978) 
Diversification 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.439) (0.272) (0.353) (0.286) (0.319) 
Market Run-up -0.028* -0.030* -0.029* -0.029* -0.027* 
 
(-1.731) (-1.870) (-1.804) (-1.800) (-1.722) 
Stock Run-up 0.055** 0.056** 0.053** 0.054** 0.050** 
 
(2.266) (2.340) (2.228) (2.252) (2.060) 
Stock Return Volatility -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(-1.092) (-0.817) (-0.900) (-0.716) (-0.487) 
Inflation 0.052 0.037 0.035 0.033 0.014 
 
(0.744) (0.575) (0.539) (0.497) (0.209) 
KKZ-index -1.300** -1.475** -1.597*** -1.432** -1.432** 
 
(-2.234) (-2.512) (-2.773) (-2.484) (-2.475) 
Economic Freedom 0.083** 0.082** 0.103*** 0.088** 0.089** 
 
(2.334) (2.346) (2.847) (2.395) (2.436) 
GDP Growth 0.165** 0.177** 0.149* 0.155** 0.198** 
 
(2.149) (2.260) (1.886) (2.029) (2.528) 
Constant -9.244*** -10.751*** -9.613*** -8.301*** -10.677*** 
 
(-3.650) (-4.048) (-3.831) (-3.297) (-4.092) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1307 1307 1307 1307 1307 
adj. R-sq 0.030 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.033 
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Table 5 Robustness tests 
This table presents the results of regression analyses of stock price reactions around bank SEOs using the sample without the U.S. data, the sample including only OECD countries, and the 
sample without right offerings and secondary issuances respectively. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) measured over the window (-1, 1) relative to the 
announcement date, calculated using standard event study methodology with the estimation period from -250 days to -10 days.  t-statistics are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets. Detailed definitions of variables can be found in Appendix 1. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.  
 
Without US OECD countries Without rights and secondary offerings 
 
Initial Capital 
Stringency 
Prompt 
Corrective 
Action 
Depositor 
Protection 
Initial Capital 
Stringency 
Prompt 
Corrective 
Action 
Depositor 
Protection 
Initial Capital 
Stringency 
Prompt 
Corrective 
Action 
Depositor 
Protection 
  
Bank Regulation 4.227** 3.613*** 0.075 9.394* 8.603*** 4.057*** 10.014*** 9.701** 3.413* 
 
(2.208) (3.894) (0.033) (1.875) (2.643) (2.589) (2.583) (2.206) (1.802) 
Bank Regulation Squared -3.547** -3.383*** -0.108 -7.666** -9.900*** -5.298*** -7.797*** -8.822*** -4.878** 
 
(-2.382) (-3.063) (-0.039) (-2.253) (-3.668) (-3.104) (-2.900) (-2.794) (-2.311) 
Ln(TA) 0.261** 0.215* 0.251** 0.221*** 0.178** 0.220*** 0.127 0.074 0.089 
 
(2.472) (1.941) (2.331) (2.628) (2.166) (2.653) (1.358) (0.802) (0.963) 
Equity/Total Assets 0.048 0.061 0.053 0.036 0.039 0.038 -0.055* -0.054 -0.051 
 
(0.810) (1.040) (0.922) (0.930) (0.994) (1.000) (-1.709) (-1.614) (-1.561) 
Diversification 0.033** 0.033** 0.034** -0.009 -0.011 -0.011 0.004 0.007 0.006 
 
(2.344) (2.367) (2.405) (-0.600) (-0.742) (-0.752) (0.245) (0.468) (0.388) 
Market Run-up -0.033** -0.032** -0.032** -0.035* -0.034* -0.034* -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 
 
(-2.256) (-2.212) (-2.202) (-1.884) (-1.831) (-1.834) (-1.345) (-1.335) (-1.323) 
Stock Run-up 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.048* 0.046* 0.039 0.050* 0.045 0.044 
 
(0.958) (0.880) (0.837) (1.831) (1.834) (1.549) (1.728) (1.644) (1.589) 
Stock Volatility -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-1.147) (-1.109) (-1.159) (-0.813) (-1.177) (-0.537) (-0.515) (-0.429) (-0.193) 
Inflation 0.026 0.026 0.018 0.030 -0.245** -0.020 -0.019 -0.036 -0.019 
 
(0.406) (0.390) (0.279) (0.257) (-2.008) (-0.158) (-0.219) (-0.411) (-0.214) 
KKZ-index -1.620** -1.675*** -1.565** -1.332* -1.667** -1.484** -2.327*** -2.000*** -2.228*** 
 
(-2.573) (-2.707) (-2.525) (-1.836) (-2.370) (-2.015) (-2.880) (-2.703) (-2.937) 
Economic Freedom 0.072* 0.084** 0.072* 0.077* 0.169*** 0.112** 0.138*** 0.130*** 0.153*** 
 
(1.862) (2.048) (1.712) (1.916) (3.751) (2.457) (3.012) (2.839) (3.192) 
GDP Growth 0.179** 0.166** 0.176** 0.204*** 0.235*** 0.198*** 0.222** 0.162 0.163 
 
(2.248) (2.042) (2.237) (2.649) (3.082) (2.581) (2.043) (1.505) (1.535) 
Constant -11.341*** -10.767*** -10.231*** -11.409*** -14.089*** -11.052*** -12.768*** -10.537*** -10.572*** 
 
(-3.460) (-3.637) (-3.297) (-3.521) (-4.812) (-3.775) (-3.661) (-3.358) (-3.335) 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 641 641 641 1085 1085 1085 797 797 797 
adj. R-sq 0.07 0.07 0.067 0.024 0.034 0.027 0.036 0.040 0.036 
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Table 6 Bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effect: Instrumental variable approach 
This table presents the results of regression analyses of stock price reaction to bank issued SEO announcement. The dependent 
variable is the cumulative abnormal stock return measured over the window (-1,1) relative to the announcement date, calculated using 
the standard event study methodology with the estimation period from -250 days to -10 days. We use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
model to address the endogeneity problem between the bank regulation and CARs. We use the exogenous cross-country, cross-year 
variation in the timing of the Basel II adoption as the instrument to bank regulation stringency to assess the causal impact of bank 
regulation on SEO announcement effects. We report both the first and second stage results. In the first stage regression, we regress 
bank regulation measures on all exogenous variables and the instrument variable Basel II dummy. In the second stage, we use the 
predicted value of bank regulation measures from the first stage as the independent variable. Panel A reports the corresponding first-
stage regression results with the endogenous variable bank regulation as the dependent variable. Detailed definitions of variables can 
be found in Appendix 1. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Panel B reports the second-stage regression results from the 2SLS 
analysis. The dependent variable is the CAR. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Activity 
Restriction 
Initial Capital 
Stringency 
Deposit Insurer 
Power 
Prompt Corrective 
Action 
Total 
Regulation 
Panel A: First stage  
     Basel II 1.652** 0.232*** 0.168*** 1.226*** 0.194*** 
 
(2.452) (14.078) (9.162) (10.371) (15.395) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Second stage 
     Bank Regulation 0.089 11.146*** -1.691 7.990** 9.905** 
 
(0.094) (3.167) (-0.355) (2.162) (2.100) 
Bank Regulation 
squared -0.111 -7.244*** 0.599 -3.785* -9.807** 
 
(-0.368) (-2.920) (0.171) (-1.911) (-2.538) 
Ln(TA) 0.165** 0.183** 0.146* 0.319** 0.156** 
 
(2.114) (2.349) (1.892) (2.296) (2.019) 
Equity/Total Assets 0.043 0.034 0.040 0.027 0.034 
 
(1.096) (0.868) (1.024) (0.675) (0.853) 
Diversification 0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.005 0.004 
 
(0.058) (-0.026) (0.125) (-0.409) (0.360) 
Market Run-up -0.024 -0.025 -0.023 -0.019 -0.023 
 
(-1.531) (-1.629) (-1.491) (-1.246) (-1.500) 
Stock Run-up 0.058** 0.057** 0.058** 0.042* 0.058** 
 
(2.459) (2.428) (2.450) (1.674) (2.442) 
Stock Volatility 0.045 0.066 0.027 0.188* 0.013 
 
(0.646) (1.001) (0.404) (1.706) (0.191) 
Inflation 0.157** 0.216*** 0.176** 0.183** 0.196*** 
 
(2.098) (2.773) (2.273) (2.420) (2.629) 
KKZ-index -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 
 
(-0.852) (-0.562) (-0.708) (-1.236) (-0.709) 
Economic Freedom 0.086** 0.080** 0.091*** -0.011 0.072** 
 
(2.578) (2.423) (2.673) (-0.174) (2.095) 
GDP Growth -1.577*** -1.954*** -1.539*** -0.722 -1.541*** 
 
(-2.950) (-3.509) (-2.985) (-1.093) (-2.950) 
Constant -8.371*** -11.836*** -7.704*** -6.100** -9.016*** 
 
(-3.361) (-4.424) (-2.864) (-2.343) (-3.721) 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effect No No No No No 
N 1307 1307 1307 1307 1307 
adj. R-sq 0.035 0.040 0.035 0.039 0.037 
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Table 7 Bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effects, including involuntary issuance 
This table presents the results of regression analyses of stock price reactions on bank-issued SEO announcements from 21 
countries for the period from January 2001 to December 2012. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) measured over the window (-1,1) relative to the announcement date, calculated using the standard event study 
methodology with an estimation period from -250 days to -10 days. We include the dummy variable Involuntary and the 
interaction term of Involuntary and Initial Capital Stringency. Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in 
Appendix 1. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) 
 
CAR CAR 
Initial Capital Stringency 7.965** 12.857*** 
 
(2.291) (3.061) 
Initial Capital Stringency Squared -6.409*** -10.263*** 
 
(-2.603) (-3.577) 
Involuntary * Initial Capital Stringency 
 
-16.700*** 
  
(-2.710) 
Involuntary * Initial Capital Stringency Squared 
 
13.239*** 
  
(2.712) 
Involuntary -0.752 3.556** 
 
(-1.567) (1.970) 
Ln(TA) 0.166** 0.167** 
 
(2.075) (2.067) 
Equity/Total Assets 0.027 0.027 
 
(0.693) (0.699) 
Diversification 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.237) (0.255) 
Market Run-up -0.029* -0.029* 
 
(-1.795) (-1.784) 
Stock Run-up 0.056** 0.056** 
 
(2.350) (2.368) 
Stock Return Volatility 0.020 0.009 
 
(0.315) (0.144) 
Inflation 0.158** 0.162** 
 
(1.969) (2.015) 
KKZ-index -0.002 -0.002 
 
(-0.871) (-0.758) 
Economic Freedom 0.067* 0.056 
 
(1.825) (1.520) 
GDP Growth -1.250** -1.108* 
 
(-2.044) (-1.771) 
Constant -9.413*** -10.250*** 
 
(-3.333) (-3.559) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
N 1307 1307 
adj. R-sq 0.036 0.039 
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
Variable name Classification Description 
CAR Bank-specific The cumulative abnormal return over the three-day event window (-1,1) from one day before to one day 
after the SEO announcement date. 
Activity Restriction Regulation A measure of a bank's ability to engage in the businesses of securities underwriting, insurance, and real 
estate and of the regulatory restrictiveness of banks to own shares in non-financial firms. The level of 
regulatory restrictiveness can be defined as “unrestricted” and coded as a score of 1. If the full range of 
activities can be conducted, but some or all must be conducted in subsidiaries, then it can be defined as 
“permitted” and coded as a score of 2. If less than a full range of activities can be conducted in a bank or 
subsidiaries, then it can be defined as “restricted” and counted as a score of 3. If the activity cannot be 
conducted in either the bank or subsidiaries, then it is defined as “prohibited” and counted as a score of 
4. Activity restriction is calculated by the sum of the answers to these questions divided by 4. Greater 
values signify more restrictions. 
Initial Capital 
Stringency 
Regulation Whether the source of funds that count as regulatory capital can include assets other than cash or 
government securities and borrowed funds and whether the regulatory supervisory authorities verify the 
sources of capital. This index is based on the following question (Yes=1, No=0): Are the sources of 
funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? Can the initial 
disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be performed with assets other than cash or government 
securities? Can the initial disbursement of capital be performed with borrowed funds? Initial capital 
stringency is calculated by the sum of the answers to these questions divided by 3. Higher values 
indicate greater stringency. 
Deposit Insurer Power Regulation The deposit insurer power scheme is an index of the deposit insurer power to measure each country’s 
deposit insurance regime and to trace its evolution from 1999 to 2011. This index is based on the answer 
to the following questions (Yes=1, No=0): (1) Does the deposit insurance authority make the decision to 
intervene in a bank? Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action for violations of laws, 
regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against bank directors or other bank officials? 
Has the deposit insurance agency/fund ever taken legal action for violations of laws, regulations, and 
bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against bank directors or other bank officials? Were any 
deposits not explicitly covered by the deposit insurance at the time of the failure compensated when the 
bank failed (excluding funds later paid out in liquidation procedures)? Deposit insurer power is equal to 
{[(1)+(2)+(3)]/3 + (4)}/2. This variable ranges from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate more power. 
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Prompt Corrective 
Action 
Regulation Prompt corrective action measures the extent to which the law establishes pre-determined levels of bank 
solvency deterioration that force automatic enforcement actions, such as intervention, and the extent to 
which supervisors have the requisite, suitable powers to do so. This variable is based on several 
questions (Yes=1, No=0): (1) Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure? Are there any mechanisms of cease and desist-type orders, whose infraction 
leads to the automatic imposition of civil and penal sanctions against the bank’s directors and managers? 
Can the supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or management to constitute provisions to cover 
actual or potential losses? Can the supervisory agency suspend the director’s decision to distribute 
dividends? Can the supervisory agency suspend the director’s decision to distribute bonuses? Can the 
supervisory agency suspend the director’s decision to distribute management fees? Prompt corrective 
action is calculated as the sum of the score for each question and divided by 6. A higher value indicates 
greater supervisory power.  
 
Total Regulation 
 
Regulation 
 
We collapse the four regulation measures into a single measure of bank regulation using factor analysis. 
We estimate the following equation: Yi,s,t=βi Regulations,s,t+εi,t, where the subscripts i, s, and t 
correspond to the country, the four regulation measures (Activity Restriction, Initial Capital Stringency, 
Deposit Insurer Power, and Prompt Corrective Action), and years, respectively. The left-hand-side 
variables are the four regulation measures, all of which are stacked into a single factor, whereas 
regulation is not observed and estimated along with the factor loadings β. We follow the standard 
practice of normalizing the proxy measures included on the left-hand side to have a mean of zero and a 
variance of one before we conduct the factor analysis. We focus on the single factor that has the greatest 
explanatory power. It turns out that our data are well described by a one-factor model, which captures 
approximately 55% of the variation in the four regulation measures. We take this factor as our final 
measure of overall bank regulation.  
Total assets Bank-specific A natural logarithm of total assets denominated in US dollars 
Equity/Total Assets Bank-specific The ratio of capital over total assets. 
Diversification Bank-specific The ratio of non-interest income over total operating income. 
Stock Run-up Bank-specific The stock return over the window (-60,-2) relative to the announcement date. 
Stock Return Volatility Bank-specific Annualized stock return volatility, calculated from daily returns over the window (-250,-10) relative to 
the SEO announcement date. 
Involuntary Bank-specific A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the bank SEO is issued when either one of the bank's capital ratio, 
equity-to-assets ratio, tier 1 capital ratio or total capital ratio is less than the government's requirement, 
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and 0 otherwise. 
Market Run-up Market-specific The return on the S&P 500 index over the window (-60,-2) relative to the announcement date. 
Inflation Country-specific The percentage change of GDP deflator. 
KKZ-index Country-specific An indicator of the quality of institutional development in the country. Calculated as the average of six 
indicators: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule 
of law, and control over corruption. Greater values signify a better institutional environment. 
Economic Freedom Country-specific An index based on trade freedom, business freedom, investment freedom, and property rights (ranging 
from 1 to 5). Calculated as 6 minus the economic freedom index of the Heritage Foundation. 
GDP Growth Country-specific The annual growth rate of GDP. 
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The Effects of Bank Regulation Stringency on Seasoned Equity Offering Announcements 
Highlights: 
 We study the relation between bank regulation stringency and announcement effects of seasoned equity offerings across 21 countries.  
 Under a low to moderate bank regulation environment, the market reacts more positively to the bank SEO announcements for an increase 
in the level of bank regulation.  
 The bank SEO announcement effects become more negative if the bank regulation becomes too stringent.  
 Bank regulation has no significant impact of SEO announcement effects if the equity offering is involuntary.  
 
 
